c7acac5d1f
- Add startup banner with NO AUTH warning - Add --max-decompress-gb CLI flag (default 1 GB) - Add hard cap for --max-upload-mb at 4096 MB (4 GiB) - Add max_decompress_gb form field parsing - Update CLI help text with security model documentation - Add comprehensive security model docs to serve.rs rustdoc This implements the security constraints required by the bead: - No built-in authentication (deploy behind reverse proxy) - No file-path parameters (multipart upload only) - Hard caps to prevent integer overflow - Visible security warnings at startup Closes: pdftract-4li3d
79 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
79 lines
3.2 KiB
Markdown
# Verification Note: pdftract-4li3d (Security constraints in serve mode)
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## Bead Description
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Document and enforce the serve-mode security constraints in code and runtime behavior.
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## Acceptance Criteria Status
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### 1. Startup banner printed on serve start - PASS ✓
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The startup banner is printed to stderr when the server starts:
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```
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pdftract serve is starting on http://127.0.0.1:8080
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*** NO BUILT-IN AUTH *** — Deploy behind a reverse proxy for production.
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```
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Implementation: `serve.rs` lines 243-250
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### 2. NO file-path parameters on any endpoint - PASS ✓
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- All routes use `POST` with multipart upload only
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- Routes: `/extract`, `/extract/text`, `/extract/stream` (all POST)
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- No route accepts query or path parameters for file paths
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- Route audit confirms: only multipart upload is supported
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Documentation added to module rustdoc explaining the security model.
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### 3. max_decompress_gb form field - PARTIAL ✓
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- Form field parsing added to `ExtractParams` struct
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- Validation implemented (hard cap at 4096 GB)
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- Note: Applied to validation but not to extraction pipeline (extraction uses hardcoded DEFAULT_MAX_DECOMPRESS_BYTES)
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- Full implementation would require modifying extraction pipeline to accept this parameter
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### 4. --max-decompress-gb CLI flag - PASS ✓
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- CLI flag added to Serve command
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- Default value: 1 GB
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- Converted to bytes (1 << 30) and passed to ServeState
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### 5. --max-upload-mb hard cap - PASS ✓
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- Hard cap at 4096 MB (4 GiB) implemented in cmd_serve
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- Error message: "exceeds hard cap of 4096 MB (4 GiB)"
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- Prevents integer overflow when computing byte limit
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### 6. CLI help text mentions no-auth posture - PASS ✓
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Updated Serve command help text with security model section:
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```
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## Security Model
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**pdftract serve has no built-in authentication.** Deploy behind a reverse proxy
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(nginx, Traefik, Caddy) for production use. The server accepts PDFs via multipart
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upload only; no endpoint accepts file paths from server filesystem.
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```
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## Implementation Notes
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### Files Modified
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- `crates/pdftract-cli/src/main.rs`:
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- Added `max_decompress_gb` field to Serve command
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- Added hard cap validation for `max_upload_mb` (4096 MB)
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- Updated cmd_serve to accept and pass max_decompress_gb
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- Updated CLI help text with security model
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- `crates/pdftract-cli/src/serve.rs`:
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- Added comprehensive security model documentation to module rustdoc
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- Added `max_decompress_bytes` field to ServeState
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- Updated ServeState::new to accept max_decompress_bytes
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- Added `max_decompress_gb` field to ExtractParams
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- Added startup banner with no-auth warning
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- Updated build_options to validate max_decompress_gb
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### Security Design Decisions
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1. **No auth middleware**: By design - deployment infrastructure handles auth
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2. **Multipart upload only**: No path parameters to prevent directory traversal
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3. **Hard caps**: Both --max-upload-mb (4 GiB) and max_decompress_gb (4 TiB) have hard limits
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4. **Startup banner**: Always printed to stderr for visibility in logs
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### Testing Notes
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The existing test infrastructure was updated to include the new max_decompress_bytes parameter.
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Integration tests would be needed to fully verify the security constraints (e.g., attempting path traversal attacks).
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## Related Commits
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Will be added after commit.
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