diff --git a/notes/pdftract-4em4l.md b/notes/pdftract-4em4l.md
index 608d063..a1d7997 100644
--- a/notes/pdftract-4em4l.md
+++ b/notes/pdftract-4em4l.md
@@ -2,121 +2,110 @@
 
 ## Summary
 
-The `--audit-log FILE` flag and audit logging infrastructure was already fully implemented in the codebase. This note documents the verification of the acceptance criteria.
+The audit logging infrastructure is **fully implemented** across all public-listener subcommands. This verification confirms that all requirements from the task description are met.
 
-## Acceptance Criteria Status
+## Implementation Status
 
-### ✅ --audit-log FILE flag implemented
-- **serve**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/main.rs:322` - AuditLogWriter passed to serve::run
-- **mcp**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/main.rs:385` - AuditLogWriter passed to mcp::run_stdio/run_http
-- **inspect**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/inspect/args.rs:44-62` - audit_log field on InspectArgs
+### 1. Core Audit Infrastructure ✅
 
-### ✅ Per-request NDJSON line with all documented fields
-**AuditRecord schema** (`crates/pdftract-core/src/audit.rs:33-52`):
-- `ts`: ISO-8601 RFC3339 UTC timestamp
-- `client_ip`: Option<String> - HTTP peer or stdio (absent)
-- `tool`: String - Tool name (extract, classify, mcp.extract, etc.)
-- `fingerprint`: Option<String> - PDF structural fingerprint (pdftract-v1:hex)
-- `duration_ms`: u64 - Request duration in milliseconds
-- `status`: u16 - HTTP-style status code (200 ok, 4xx client error, 5xx server error)
-- `diagnostics`: Vec<String> - Diagnostic codes (XREF_REPAIRED, STREAM_BOMB, etc.)
+**File: `crates/pdftract-core/src/audit.rs`**
+- `AuditLogWriter`: Thread-safe NDJSON writer with crash-safe writes
+  - Single atomic write per line (BufWriter with flush)
+  - Supports stdout (`-`), stderr (`/dev/stderr`), and file paths
+- `AuditRecord`: Schema with all required fields:
+  - `ts`: ISO-8601 RFC3339 UTC timestamp
+  - `client_ip`: Optional string (absent for stdio MCP)
+  - `tool`: Tool name
+  - `fingerprint`: Structural fingerprint (pdftract-v1:hex form)
+  - `duration_ms`: Request duration in milliseconds
+  - `status`: HTTP-style status code (200, 4xx, 5xx)
+  - `diagnostics`: Vec of diagnostic code strings
 
-### ✅ Stdio MCP requests OMIT the client_ip field
-**Implementation**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/mcp/stdio.rs:364,476`
-```rust
-None, // No client_ip for stdio mode
-```
+### 2. NEVER-Log Policy Enforcement ✅
 
-### ✅ Log-policy enforcement (compile-time)
-**CI Gate**: `.ci/scripts/check-log-policy.sh`
-- Scans for credential patterns in log/println/eprintln calls
-- Checks for password, token, secret, api_key patterns
-- Checks for content leaks (body, content, text, data)
-- Runs in CI to prevent violations from being merged
+**File: `crates/pdftract-core/src/log_policy.rs`**
+- `redact_log_line()`: Runtime redaction for free-form logs
+- `redact_audit_log_line()`: Specialized redaction for audit logs (preserves JSON structure)
+- `is_sensitive_header()`: Checks for sensitive headers
+- `redact_header_value()`: Redacts header values
+- Patterns detected:
+  - Passwords: `password:`, `pwd:`, `pass:`, `passwd:`
+  - Tokens: `token:`, `bearer`, `api_key`, `secret`
+  - Headers: Authorization, Cookie, Proxy-Authorization
+  - Base64-like strings (JWT tokens, API keys)
+  - Long words (>100 chars) truncated in free-form logs
 
-### ✅ Log-policy enforcement (runtime)
-**Runtime redaction mechanisms**:
-1. **Password redaction**: `crates/pdftract-core/src/parser/stream.rs:3167` - Debug/Serialize redacts password
-2. **Header redaction**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/mcp/http.rs:641-657` - `redact_headers_for_log()` redacts Authorization/Cookie/Proxy-Authorization
-3. **Panic hook redaction**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/panic_hook.rs:58-79` - Redacts SecretString from backtraces
-4. **Encryption debug redaction**: `crates/pdftract-core/src/encryption/aes_256.rs:423-427` - Debug redacts encryption keys
+### 3. Audit Middleware ✅
 
-### ✅ TH-08 test for log policy
-**Test**: `tests/security/TH-08-log-audit.rs`
-- Runs extraction with `RUST_LOG=trace` (maximum verbosity)
-- Captures stderr (log output)
-- Verifies no sensitive content appears in logs
-- Tests for password, bearer token, PDF bytes, and sensitive headers
+**File: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/middleware/audit.rs`**
+- `audit_middleware`: Tower middleware for axum
+  - Extracts client IP from peer address (default) or X-Forwarded-For (with --trust-forwarded-for)
+  - Records request start time
+  - Extracts tool name from path
+  - Stores `RequestMetadata` in extensions for handlers
+- `AuditState`: Holds optional AuditLogWriter and trust_forwarded_for flag
+- `RequestMetadata`: Start time, client_ip, tool
 
-### ✅ Rotation policy documented in --help output
-**Documentation**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/main.rs:306-320`
-```text
-## Audit log rotation
+### 4. CLI Flags ✅
 
-pdftract does NOT rotate the audit log. Operators MUST configure logrotate(8)
-to manage log file size and retention. A typical logrotate configuration:
-```
+**File: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/main.rs`**
+- Serve subcommand (lines 304-309): `--audit-log FILE` with rotation documentation
+- MCP subcommand (lines 354-359): Same flag and documentation
+- Trust-forwarded-for flag (lines 311-313): `--trust-forwarded-for` flag
 
-### ✅ Fingerprint logged, NOT path/URL
-**Implementation**:
-- `crates/pdftract-core/src/audit.rs:44` - `fingerprint: Option<String>` stores structural fingerprint
-- `crates/pdftract-cli/src/serve.rs:582` - Extracts fingerprint from result
-- `crates/pdftract-cli/src/serve.rs:604` - Logs fingerprint instead of path
+**File: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/inspect/args.rs`**
+- Inspect subcommand (lines 44-49): Same audit-log flag with rotation documentation
 
-### ✅ AuditLogWriter is crash-safe
-**Implementation**: `crates/pdftract-core/src/audit.rs:135-143`
-```rust
-pub fn write_record(&self, record: &AuditRecord) -> Result<()> {
-    let json = serde_json::to_string(record)?;
-    let mut writer = self.writer.lock()?;
-    writeln!(writer, "{}", json)?;
-    writer.flush()?;  // Flush after each line for crash safety
-    Ok(())
-}
-```
+### 5. Serve Mode Integration ✅
 
-## Middleware Integration
+**File: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/serve.rs`**
+- Lines 70-82: Imports AuditLogWriter and AuditState
+- Lines 109-111: ServeState includes audit field
+- Lines 117-125: ServeState::new creates AuditState with trust_forwarded_for support
+- Lines 386-394: Creates AuditLogWriter from --audit-log flag
+- Lines 419-421: Applies audit_middleware layer
+- Lines 599-609: Writes audit log after successful extraction
+- Lines 678-688: Writes audit log for text extraction
 
-### HTTP Serve
-**File**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/middleware/audit.rs`
-- Extracts client IP from peer address or X-Forwarded-For
-- Stores RequestMetadata in request extensions
-- Handlers write audit logs after extraction completes
+### 6. MCP Stdio Mode Integration ✅
 
-### MCP HTTP
-**File**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/mcp/http.rs:254-291`
-- Writes audit log after handling POST requests
-- Includes client_ip, duration_ms, status, diagnostics
+**File: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/mcp/stdio.rs`**
+- Lines 349-365: Writes audit log with `client_ip: None` (stdio mode has no peer address)
 
-### MCP Stdio
-**File**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/mcp/stdio.rs:361-370`
-- Writes audit log for tools/call requests
-- Omits client_ip (stdio mode has no client)
+### 7. MCP HTTP Mode Integration ✅
 
-### Inspect
-**File**: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/inspect/inspect.rs:79-94`
-- Creates AuditLogWriter from args.audit_log
-- Stores in InspectorState with AuditState wrapper
+**File: `crates/pdftract-cli/src/mcp/http.rs`**
+- Lines 255-292: Writes audit log with client_ip (HTTP mode has peer address)
 
-## NEVER-Log Policy
+### 8. Test Coverage ✅
 
-The following are NEVER logged at any level:
-- Password values (redacted via SecretString)
-- Bearer tokens (redacted via header redaction)
-- PDF bytes (not logged; only fingerprint)
-- Extracted text content (not logged; only metadata)
-- Cookie/Authorization/Proxy-Authorization headers (redacted)
+**File: `tests/security/TH-08-log-audit.rs`**
+- Tests that PDF content is never logged at trace level
+- Tests that password values are never logged
+- Tests that bearer tokens are never logged
+- Tests that PDF bytes are never logged
+- Tests that sensitive headers are never logged
 
-## Test Results
+## Acceptance Criteria Verification
 
-**Audit module tests**: All 6 tests passed
-- test_audit_record_new
-- test_audit_record_with_client_ip
-- test_audit_record_with_diagnostics
-- test_audit_record_add_diagnostic
-- test_audit_record_serialize
-- test_audit_log_writer_memory
+| Criterion | Status | Evidence |
+|-----------|--------|----------|
+| `--audit-log FILE` flag on serve, mcp, inspect | ✅ | main.rs:304-309, 354-359; inspect/args.rs:44-49 |
+| Per-request NDJSON line with all fields | ✅ | audit.rs:40-58 (AuditRecord) |
+| Stdio MCP omits client_ip field | ✅ | stdio.rs:357 (None for client_ip) |
+| NEVER-log policy enforcement | ✅ | log_policy.rs:48-161 (redaction) |
+| Rotation policy in --help | ✅ | main.rs:306-308, 356-358; inspect/args.rs:45-47 |
+| Fingerprint logged, not path/URL | ✅ | audit.rs:50-51 (fingerprint field) |
+| AuditLogWriter crash-safe | ✅ | audit.rs:102-154 (BufWriter + flush) |
+| Trust-forwarded-for flag | ✅ | main.rs:311-313; middleware/audit.rs:99-121 |
+| TH-08 test exists | ✅ | tests/security/TH-08-log-audit.rs |
 
 ## Conclusion
 
-All acceptance criteria for pdftract-4em4l are satisfied. The audit logging infrastructure is fully implemented and tested.
+All acceptance criteria are met. The audit logging infrastructure is complete and operational across:
+- `pdftract serve` (HTTP mode)
+- `pdftract mcp --stdio` (stdio mode)
+- `pdftract mcp --bind` (HTTP+SSE mode)
+- `pdftract inspect` (inspector mode)
+
+The NEVER-log policy is enforced at runtime via `redact_audit_log_line()`, and the TH-08 test verifies compliance.