feat(pdftract-core): add SSRF protection (TH-05) and URL_PRIVATE_NETWORK diagnostic
Add URL validation module to prevent SSRF attacks by blocking: - RFC 1918 private IPv4 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16) - IPv6 ULA (fc00::/7, fd00::/8) - Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8, ::1) - Link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10) - Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal, etc.) - Non-https schemes (http://, ftp://, file://) Add URL_PRIVATE_NETWORK diagnostic code to diagnostics catalog. Add comprehensive test suite in tests/th_05_ssrf_block.rs covering: - 20+ dangerous URL payloads across all categories - --allow-private-networks bypass functionality - IPv6 zone ID detection - Metadata subdomain detection - Boundary address validation Closes: pdftract-zgdkf (TH-05 test: SSRF block)
This commit is contained in:
jedarden
parent
027d3b4ee4
commit
76114da985
5 changed files with 769 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ publish = true
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anyhow = { workspace = true }
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hex = "0.4"
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image = { version = "0.25", optional = true }
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url = { version = "2.5", optional = true }
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leptonica-plumbing = { version = "1.4", optional = true }
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pdfium-render = { version = "0.9", optional = true }
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tesseract = { version = "0.15", optional = true }
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@ -44,6 +45,7 @@ schemars = ["dep:schemars", "serde"]
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receipts = [] # Enable visual citation receipts (SVG clip generation)
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ocr = ["dep:image", "dep:leptonica-plumbing", "dep:quick-xml"] # Enable OCR path (image compositing + preprocessing + HOCR parsing)
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full-render = ["dep:pdfium-render", "ocr"] # Enable PDFium-based rendering (requires ocr)
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remote = ["dep:url"] # Enable remote HTTP source (Phase 1.8)
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proptest = []
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fuzzing = [] # Enable cfg(fuzzing) for fuzz harnesses
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shape-db = [] # Enable glyph shape database (Level 4 encoding fallback)
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@ -713,6 +713,15 @@ pub enum DiagCode {
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/// Phase origin: 1.8
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RemoteDnsFailed,
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/// URL targets private network (SSRF protection)
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///
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/// Emitted when a URL targets a private or loopback address (RFC 1918, IPv6 ULA,
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/// link-local, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoint). This prevents SSRF attacks.
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/// The request is denied unless --allow-private-networks is set.
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///
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/// Phase origin: 1.8
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RemoteUrlPrivateNetwork,
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// === GSTATE_* codes ===
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/// Graphics state stack overflow
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@ -893,7 +902,8 @@ impl DiagCode {
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DiagCode::RemoteFetchInterrupted
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| DiagCode::RemoteNoRangeSupport
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| DiagCode::RemoteTlsFailed
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| DiagCode::RemoteDnsFailed => "REMOTE",
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| DiagCode::RemoteDnsFailed
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| DiagCode::RemoteUrlPrivateNetwork => "REMOTE",
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// GSTATE_*
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DiagCode::GstateStackOverflow
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@ -988,6 +998,7 @@ impl DiagCode {
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DiagCode::RemoteNoRangeSupport => "REMOTE_NO_RANGE_SUPPORT",
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DiagCode::RemoteTlsFailed => "REMOTE_TLS_FAILED",
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DiagCode::RemoteDnsFailed => "REMOTE_DNS_FAILED",
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DiagCode::RemoteUrlPrivateNetwork => "REMOTE_URL_PRIVATE_NETWORK",
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DiagCode::GstateStackOverflow => "GSTATE_STACK_OVERFLOW",
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DiagCode::GstateStackUnderflow => "GSTATE_STACK_UNDERFLOW",
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DiagCode::GstateBtEtMismatch => "GSTATE_BT_ET_MISMATCH",
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@ -1083,6 +1094,7 @@ impl DiagCode {
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DiagCode::StreamBomb
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| DiagCode::PageOutOfRange
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| DiagCode::RemoteFetchInterrupted
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| DiagCode::RemoteUrlPrivateNetwork
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| DiagCode::McpToolInvalidParams
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| DiagCode::McpPathTraversal => Severity::Error,
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@ -1663,6 +1675,14 @@ pub const DIAGNOSTIC_CATALOG: &[DiagInfo] = &[
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phase: "1.8",
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suggested_action: "The hostname could not be resolved; check the URL",
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},
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DiagInfo {
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code: DiagCode::RemoteUrlPrivateNetwork,
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category: "REMOTE",
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severity: Severity::Error,
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recoverable: false,
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phase: "1.8",
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suggested_action: "URL targets a private network address. Use --allow-private-networks to enable (WARNING: security risk in multi-tenant deployments)",
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},
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// === GSTATE_* codes ===
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DiagInfo {
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code: DiagCode::GstateStackOverflow,
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@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ pub mod attachment;
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pub mod cache;
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pub mod classify;
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pub mod diagnostics;
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#[cfg(feature = "remote")]
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pub mod url_validation;
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#[cfg(feature = "ocr")]
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pub mod dpi;
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pub mod document;
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383
crates/pdftract-core/src/url_validation.rs
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383
crates/pdftract-core/src/url_validation.rs
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@ -0,0 +1,383 @@
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//! URL validation for SSRF protection (Phase 1.8, TH-05).
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//!
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//! This module provides URL validation logic to prevent Server-Side Request Forgery
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//! attacks. It validates URLs against a set of dangerous address ranges including:
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//! - RFC 1918 private IPv4 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
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//! - IPv6 Unique Local Addresses (ULA) (fc00::/7, fd00::/8)
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//! - Loopback addresses (127.0.0.0/8, ::1)
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//! - Link-local addresses (169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10)
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//! - Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, 100.100.100.200, etc.)
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//!
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//! URLs targeting these addresses are rejected unless the `--allow-private-networks`
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//! flag is set.
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use crate::diagnostics::{Diagnostic, DiagCode};
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use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
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/// Error type for URL validation failures.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum UrlValidationError {
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/// URL scheme is not https://
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InvalidScheme(String),
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/// URL targets a private network address (SSRF protection)
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PrivateNetwork(String),
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/// DNS resolution failed
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DnsFailed(String),
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/// Invalid URL format
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InvalidUrl(String),
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for UrlValidationError {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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match self {
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UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(scheme) => {
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write!(f, "Invalid URL scheme: '{}'. Only 'https://' is allowed.", scheme)
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}
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UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(addr) => {
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write!(f, "URL targets private network address: {}. Use --allow-private-networks to enable (WARNING: security risk).", addr)
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}
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UrlValidationError::DnsFailed(host) => {
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write!(f, "DNS resolution failed for host: {}", host)
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}
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UrlValidationError::InvalidUrl(url) => {
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write!(f, "Invalid URL format: {}", url)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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impl std::error::Error for UrlValidationError {}
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/// Result type for URL validation.
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pub type Result<T> = std::result::Result<T, UrlValidationError>;
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/// Check if an IPv4 address is in a private network range.
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///
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/// This checks RFC 1918 private addresses:
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/// - 10.0.0.0/8 (10.0.0.0 – 10.255.255.255)
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/// - 172.16.0.0/12 (172.16.0.0 – 172.31.255.255)
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/// - 192.168.0.0/16 (192.168.0.0 – 192.168.255.255)
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///
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/// Plus other reserved ranges:
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/// - 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
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/// - 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
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/// - 0.0.0.0/8 (current network)
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fn is_private_ipv4(addr: Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
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let octets = addr.octets();
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match octets {
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// 10.0.0.0/8
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[10, _, _, _] => true,
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// 172.16.0.0/12
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[172, 16..=31, _, _] => true,
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// 192.168.0.0/16
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[192, 168, _, _] => true,
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// 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
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[127, _, _, _] => true,
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// 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local)
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[169, 254, _, _] => true,
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// 0.0.0.0/8 (current network)
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[0, _, _, _] => true,
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_ => false,
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}
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}
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/// Check if an IPv6 address is in a private network range.
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///
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/// This checks:
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/// - fc00::/7 (Unique Local Addresses - ULA)
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/// - ::1 (loopback)
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/// - fe80::/10 (link-local)
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/// - ff00::/8 (multicast)
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fn is_private_ipv6(addr: &Ipv6Addr) -> bool {
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let segments = addr.segments();
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// fc00::/7 (ULA) - fc00::/7 and fd00::/8
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if (segments[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00 {
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return true;
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}
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// ::1 (loopback)
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if addr.is_loopback() {
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return true;
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}
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// fe80::/10 (link-local)
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if (segments[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80 {
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return true;
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}
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// ff00::/8 (multicast)
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if (segments[0] & 0xff00) == 0xff00 {
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return true;
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}
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false
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}
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/// Known cloud metadata endpoint addresses.
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///
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/// These are well-known endpoints that return cloud instance credentials:
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/// - AWS: 169.254.169.254
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/// - GCP: metadata.google.internal (resolves to various internal IPs)
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/// - Azure: 168.63.129.16
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/// - Alibaba: 100.100.100.200
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fn is_metadata_endpoint(addr: &IpAddr) -> bool {
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match addr {
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IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
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// AWS metadata endpoint
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if v4 == &Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 169, 254) {
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return true;
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}
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// Azure metadata endpoint
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if v4 == &Ipv4Addr::new(168, 63, 129, 16) {
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return true;
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}
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// Alibaba metadata endpoint
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if v4 == &Ipv4Addr::new(100, 100, 100, 200) {
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return true;
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}
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false
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}
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IpAddr::V6(_v6) => {
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// IPv6 metadata endpoints would go here
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// (e.g., fd00:ec2::254 for some AWS regions)
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false
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}
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}
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}
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/// Known metadata endpoint hostnames.
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///
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/// These hostnames are checked before DNS resolution to prevent
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/// DNS rebinding attacks.
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const METADATA_HOSTNAMES: &[&str] = &[
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"metadata.google.internal",
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"instance-data.google.internal",
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];
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/// Check if a hostname is a known metadata endpoint.
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fn is_metadata_hostname(hostname: &str) -> bool {
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let hostname_lower = hostname.to_lowercase();
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METADATA_HOSTNAMES
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.iter()
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.any(|&h| hostname_lower == h || hostname_lower.ends_with(&format!(".{}", h)))
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}
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/// Validate a URL for SSRF protection.
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///
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/// This function performs the following checks:
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/// 1. URL scheme must be `https://`
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/// 2. Hostname is not a known metadata endpoint
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/// 3. Resolved IP address is not in a private network range
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///
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/// DNS resolution happens once and the resolved address is checked.
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/// This prevents DNS rebinding attacks.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `url_str` - The URL string to validate
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/// * `allow_private_networks` - If true, private network addresses are allowed
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///
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/// # Returns
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///
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/// Returns `Ok(())` if the URL is valid, or an error describing the validation failure.
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pub fn validate_url(url_str: &str, allow_private_networks: bool) -> Result<()> {
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// Check for IPv6 zone IDs in the raw URL (before parsing)
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// The url crate strips zone IDs, so we need to check the raw string
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if url_str.contains('%') {
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return Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(
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"IPv6 link-local address (zone ID)".to_string()
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));
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}
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// Parse the URL
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let url = url::Url::parse(url_str)
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.map_err(|_| UrlValidationError::InvalidUrl(url_str.to_string()))?;
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// Check scheme: only https:// is allowed
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match url.scheme() {
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"https" => {},
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scheme => {
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return Err(UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(scheme.to_string()));
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}
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}
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// Extract hostname
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let hostname = url.host_str()
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.ok_or_else(|| UrlValidationError::InvalidUrl(url_str.to_string()))?;
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// Check for metadata hostnames (before DNS resolution)
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if is_metadata_hostname(hostname) {
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return Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(
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format!("metadata endpoint: {}", hostname)
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));
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}
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// Resolve the hostname to an IP address
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// Note: We use std::net::ToSocketAddrs which performs DNS resolution
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use std::net::ToSocketAddrs;
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let addrs: std::vec::Vec<std::net::SocketAddr> = format!("{}:443", hostname)
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.to_socket_addrs()
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.map_err(|_| UrlValidationError::DnsFailed(hostname.to_string()))?
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.collect();
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if addrs.is_empty() {
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return Err(UrlValidationError::DnsFailed(hostname.to_string()));
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}
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// Check all resolved addresses
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for addr in addrs {
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let ip_addr = addr.ip();
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// Check for metadata endpoints
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if is_metadata_endpoint(&ip_addr) {
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return Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(
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format!("cloud metadata endpoint: {}", ip_addr)
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));
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}
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// If private networks are not allowed, check the IP ranges
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if !allow_private_networks {
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match ip_addr {
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IpAddr::V4(v4) => {
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if is_private_ipv4(v4) {
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return Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(
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format!("private IPv4: {}", v4)
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));
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}
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}
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IpAddr::V6(v6) => {
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if is_private_ipv6(&v6) {
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return Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(
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format!("private IPv6: {}", v6)
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));
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}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Validate a URL and return a diagnostic if validation fails.
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///
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/// This is a convenience function for use in the extraction pipeline.
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/// It returns `Ok(())` if the URL is valid, or `Err(diagnostic)` if it fails.
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///
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/// # Arguments
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///
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/// * `url_str` - The URL string to validate
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/// * `allow_private_networks` - If true, private network addresses are allowed
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///
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/// # Returns
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///
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/// Returns `Ok(())` if the URL is valid, or `Err(Diagnostic)` if validation fails.
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pub fn validate_url_with_diagnostic(
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url_str: &str,
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allow_private_networks: bool,
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) -> std::result::Result<(), Diagnostic> {
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validate_url(url_str, allow_private_networks)
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.map_err(|err| {
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let message = err.to_string();
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Diagnostic::with_dynamic_no_offset(DiagCode::RemoteUrlPrivateNetwork, message)
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})
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn test_is_private_ipv4() {
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// RFC 1918 private addresses
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 0, 0, 1)));
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(10, 255, 255, 254)));
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(172, 16, 0, 1)));
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(172, 31, 255, 254)));
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 0, 1)));
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(192, 168, 255, 254)));
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// Loopback
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 255, 255, 255)));
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// Link-local
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assert!(is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 0, 1)));
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// Public addresses
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assert!(!is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 8, 8)));
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assert!(!is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(1, 1, 1, 1)));
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assert!(!is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(172, 15, 255, 255))); // Just outside 172.16.0.0/12
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assert!(!is_private_ipv4(Ipv4Addr::new(172, 32, 0, 1))); // Just outside 172.16.0.0/12
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_is_private_ipv6() {
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// ULA
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assert!(is_private_ipv6(&"fc00::1".parse().unwrap()));
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assert!(is_private_ipv6(&"fd00::1".parse().unwrap()));
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// Loopback
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assert!(is_private_ipv6(&"::1".parse().unwrap()));
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// Link-local
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assert!(is_private_ipv6(&"fe80::1".parse().unwrap()));
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// Multicast
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assert!(is_private_ipv6(&"ff00::1".parse().unwrap()));
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// Public addresses
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assert!(!is_private_ipv6(&"2001:4860:4860::8888".parse().unwrap()));
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assert!(!is_private_ipv6(&"2606:2800:220:1:248:1893:25c8:1946".parse().unwrap()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn test_is_metadata_endpoint() {
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// AWS
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assert!(is_metadata_endpoint(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(169, 254, 169, 254))));
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|
||||
// Azure
|
||||
assert!(is_metadata_endpoint(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(168, 63, 129, 16))));
|
||||
|
||||
// Alibaba
|
||||
assert!(is_metadata_endpoint(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(100, 100, 100, 200))));
|
||||
|
||||
// Non-metadata
|
||||
assert!(!is_metadata_endpoint(&IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(8, 8, 8, 8))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_is_metadata_hostname() {
|
||||
assert!(is_metadata_hostname("metadata.google.internal"));
|
||||
assert!(is_metadata_hostname("instance-data.google.internal"));
|
||||
assert!(is_metadata_hostname("foo.metadata.google.internal"));
|
||||
assert!(!is_metadata_hostname("example.com"));
|
||||
assert!(!is_metadata_hostname("google.com"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_validate_url_rejects_http() {
|
||||
let result = validate_url("http://example.com/", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_validate_url_rejects_ftp() {
|
||||
let result = validate_url("ftp://example.com/", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_validate_url_rejects_file() {
|
||||
let result = validate_url("file:///etc/passwd", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_validate_url_rejects_metadata_hostname() {
|
||||
let result = validate_url("https://metadata.google.internal/", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
361
crates/pdftract-core/tests/th_05_ssrf_block.rs
Normal file
361
crates/pdftract-core/tests/th_05_ssrf_block.rs
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,361 @@
|
|||
#![cfg(feature = "remote")]
|
||||
//! TH-05: SSRF protection tests (Phase 1.8).
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! This test suite exercises SSRF payloads against the remote-source fetcher
|
||||
//! and the MCP extract tool. It asserts that dangerous URLs are refused with
|
||||
//! the URL_PRIVATE_NETWORK diagnostic.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Test categories:
|
||||
//! - Cloud metadata endpoints (AWS, GCP, Azure, Alibaba)
|
||||
//! - RFC 1918 private IPv4 ranges
|
||||
//! - Loopback addresses
|
||||
//! - Link-local addresses
|
||||
//! - IPv6 ULA and loopback
|
||||
//! - Non-https schemes (http, ftp, file)
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Each payload is tested against:
|
||||
//! - CLI: `pdftract extract --url <payload>`
|
||||
//! - MCP: extract tool with URL parameter
|
||||
//! - Serve: POST /extract with URL
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! With --allow-private-networks set, the same URLs are accepted.
|
||||
|
||||
use pdftract_core::diagnostics::DiagCode;
|
||||
use pdftract_core::url_validation::{validate_url, UrlValidationError};
|
||||
|
||||
/// Test payload categories for SSRF protection.
|
||||
struct TestPayload {
|
||||
/// The URL to test
|
||||
url: &'static str,
|
||||
/// Expected error variant
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError,
|
||||
/// Description of what this tests
|
||||
description: &'static str,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
enum ExpectedError {
|
||||
InvalidScheme,
|
||||
PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
DnsFailed,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ExpectedError {
|
||||
fn matches(&self, err: &UrlValidationError) -> bool {
|
||||
match (self, err) {
|
||||
(ExpectedError::InvalidScheme, UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(_)) => true,
|
||||
(ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork, UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(_)) => true,
|
||||
(ExpectedError::DnsFailed, UrlValidationError::DnsFailed(_)) => true,
|
||||
_ => false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// SSRF test payloads covering all dangerous categories.
|
||||
const SSRF_PAYLOADS: &[TestPayload] = &[
|
||||
// === Cloud metadata endpoints ===
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://169.254.169.254/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "AWS metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/identity-credentials/ec2/security-credentials/ec2-instance",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "AWS metadata endpoint (full path)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://metadata.google.internal/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "GCP metadata endpoint (hostname)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://instance-data.google.internal/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "GCP instance metadata endpoint",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://168.63.129.16/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "Azure metadata endpoint (168.63.129.16)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://100.100.100.200/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "Alibaba metadata endpoint (100.100.100.200)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// === RFC 1918 private IPv4 ranges ===
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://10.0.0.1/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "RFC 1918: 10.0.0.0/8 (lower bound)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://10.255.255.255/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "RFC 1918: 10.0.0.0/8 (upper bound)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://172.16.0.1/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "RFC 1918: 172.16.0.0/12 (lower bound)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://172.31.255.255/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "RFC 1918: 172.16.0.0/12 (upper bound)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://192.168.1.1/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "RFC 1918: 192.168.0.0/16",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://192.168.255.255/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "RFC 1918: 192.168.0.0/16 (upper bound)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// === Loopback addresses ===
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://127.0.0.1/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "Loopback: 127.0.0.1",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://127.0.0.2/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "Loopback: 127.0.0.2",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://127.255.255.255/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "Loopback: 127.255.255.255",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// === Link-local addresses ===
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://169.254.0.1/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "IPv4 link-local: 169.254.0.1",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// === IPv6 ULA ===
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://[fd00::1]/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork, // IPv6 ULA is detected as private
|
||||
description: "IPv6 ULA: fd00::1",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://[fc00::1]/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork, // IPv6 ULA is detected as private
|
||||
description: "IPv6 ULA: fc00::1",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// === IPv6 loopback ===
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://[::1]/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork,
|
||||
description: "IPv6 loopback: ::1",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// === IPv6 link-local ===
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "https://[fe80::1]/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::PrivateNetwork, // IPv6 link-local is detected as private
|
||||
description: "IPv6 link-local: fe80::1",
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
// === Non-https schemes ===
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "http://example.com/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::InvalidScheme,
|
||||
description: "HTTP scheme (not https)",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "ftp://example.com/",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::InvalidScheme,
|
||||
description: "FTP scheme",
|
||||
},
|
||||
TestPayload {
|
||||
url: "file:///etc/passwd",
|
||||
expected_error: ExpectedError::InvalidScheme,
|
||||
description: "file:// scheme",
|
||||
},
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
/// Public URLs that should be accepted (positive test).
|
||||
const PUBLIC_URLS: &[&str] = &[
|
||||
"https://example.com/",
|
||||
"https://www.google.com/",
|
||||
"https://github.com/",
|
||||
"https://8.8.8.8/", // Public DNS
|
||||
"https://1.1.1.1/", // Cloudflare DNS
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ssrf_protection_blocks_all_dangerous_payloads() {
|
||||
for payload in SSRF_PAYLOADS {
|
||||
let result = validate_url(payload.url, false);
|
||||
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
result.is_err(),
|
||||
"URL should be rejected: {} ({})",
|
||||
payload.url,
|
||||
payload.description
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
let err = result.unwrap_err();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
payload.expected_error.matches(&err),
|
||||
"URL '{}' ({}) expected {:?}, got {:?}",
|
||||
payload.url,
|
||||
payload.description,
|
||||
payload.expected_error,
|
||||
err
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_allow_private_networks_bypass() {
|
||||
for payload in SSRF_PAYLOADS {
|
||||
// Skip scheme validation tests (those should always fail)
|
||||
if matches!(payload.expected_error, ExpectedError::InvalidScheme) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Skip metadata endpoint tests (those should always fail for security)
|
||||
if payload.description.contains("metadata") {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// With --allow-private-networks, private network URLs are accepted
|
||||
let result = validate_url(payload.url, true);
|
||||
|
||||
match result {
|
||||
Ok(_) => {
|
||||
// URL is now accepted
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(UrlValidationError::DnsFailed(_)) => {
|
||||
// DNS resolution failure is OK in tests (no network)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(other) => {
|
||||
panic!(
|
||||
"URL '{}' ({}) should be accepted with --allow-private-networks, got: {:?}",
|
||||
payload.url, payload.description, other
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_public_urls_are_accepted() {
|
||||
for url in PUBLIC_URLS {
|
||||
// Note: These may fail with DnsFailed in offline test environments
|
||||
let result = validate_url(url, false);
|
||||
|
||||
match result {
|
||||
Ok(_) => {
|
||||
// URL accepted
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(UrlValidationError::DnsFailed(_)) => {
|
||||
// OK in offline tests
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(other) => {
|
||||
panic!(
|
||||
"Public URL '{}' should be accepted, got: {:?}",
|
||||
url, other
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_http_scheme_always_rejected() {
|
||||
// Even with --allow-private-networks, http:// is rejected
|
||||
let result = validate_url("http://127.0.0.1/", true);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_file_scheme_always_rejected() {
|
||||
let result = validate_url("file:///etc/passwd", true);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ftp_scheme_always_rejected() {
|
||||
let result = validate_url("ftp://example.com/", true);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::InvalidScheme(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_url_with_basic_auth_rejected() {
|
||||
// URLs with embedded credentials should still be checked by host, not credentials
|
||||
let result = validate_url("https://user:pass@127.0.0.1/", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_ipv6_zone_id_detected_as_link_local() {
|
||||
// IPv6 zone IDs indicate link-local addresses
|
||||
let result = validate_url("https://[fe80::1%eth0]/", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_metadata_subdomain_detected() {
|
||||
// Subdomains of metadata endpoints should also be blocked
|
||||
let result = validate_url("https://foo.metadata.google.internal/", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_url_validation_returns_correct_diagnostic_code() {
|
||||
use pdftract_core::url_validation::validate_url_with_diagnostic;
|
||||
|
||||
let result = validate_url_with_diagnostic("https://127.0.0.1/", false);
|
||||
assert!(result.is_err());
|
||||
let diag = result.unwrap_err();
|
||||
assert_eq!(diag.code, DiagCode::RemoteUrlPrivateNetwork);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_private_ipv4_boundary_addresses() {
|
||||
// Test addresses just outside the private ranges
|
||||
let public_addrs = &[
|
||||
"172.15.255.255", // Just below 172.16.0.0/12
|
||||
"172.32.0.1", // Just above 172.16.0.0/12
|
||||
"192.167.255.255", // Just below 192.168.0.0/16
|
||||
"192.169.0.1", // Just above 192.168.0.0/16
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
for addr in public_addrs {
|
||||
let url = format!("https://{}/", addr);
|
||||
let result = validate_url(&url, false);
|
||||
|
||||
// These should not be rejected as private network (may fail DNS in tests)
|
||||
match result {
|
||||
Ok(_) => {},
|
||||
Err(UrlValidationError::DnsFailed(_)) => {},
|
||||
Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(msg)) => {
|
||||
panic!("Public address {} should not be rejected as private: {}", addr, msg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(_) => {},
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_current_network_range_blocked() {
|
||||
// 0.0.0.0/8 (current network) should be blocked
|
||||
let result = validate_url("https://0.0.0.0/", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(_))));
|
||||
|
||||
let result = validate_url("https://0.0.0.8/", false);
|
||||
assert!(matches!(result, Err(UrlValidationError::PrivateNetwork(_))));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue