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+# P2.7 Auth: Bearer-Token Dispatch Implementation
+
+## Summary
+
+Implemented the bearer-token dispatch chain per plan §5 rules 0-5 with full test coverage. The implementation supports three token types simultaneously: `master_key`, `admin_key`, and search UI JWTs.
+
+## Implementation Details
+
+### Rule 0 - Dispatch-Exempt Check (`is_dispatch_exempt`)
+
+Endpoints that bypass all auth checks (handler decides auth):
+- `GET /health` - unauthenticated liveness probe (Meilisearch-compatible)
+- `GET /version` - unauthenticated version endpoint (Meilisearch-compatible)
+- `GET /_miroir/ready` - unauthenticated readiness probe (plan §10)
+- `GET /_miroir/ui/search/locale/*` - unauthenticated public locale fetch
+- `POST /_miroir/admin/login` - credentials in body
+- `GET /_miroir/ui/search/{index}/session` - auth per `search_ui.auth.mode`
+- `GET /ui/search/{index}` - public SPA entry point
+
+**Note:** `GET /_miroir/metrics` requires admin_key (NOT exempt)
+
+### Rule 1 - JWT-Shape Probe
+
+- `probe_jwt_shape()`: Checks if token has JWT structure (three dot-separated base64url segments)
+- `validate_jwt()`: Full JWT validation with:
+  - HMAC-SHA256 signature verification
+  - Expiration checking with 30s leeway
+  - Support for dual secrets during rotation (primary + previous)
+  - Key ID (`kid`) header to identify which secret signed the token
+
+### Rule 2 - Admin-Path Opaque-Token Match
+
+- `is_admin_path()`: Checks if path starts with `/_miroir/`
+- For admin paths: only `admin_key` is accepted via Bearer token
+- Master key is explicitly rejected on admin paths
+
+### Rule 3 - Master-Key Match
+
+- For non-admin paths: only `master_key` is accepted via Bearer token
+- Admin key is explicitly rejected on non-admin paths
+
+### Rule 4 - Mismatch
+
+- Missing Authorization header on auth-gated endpoints → 401 `miroir_invalid_auth`
+- Invalid token → 401 `miroir_invalid_auth`
+- JWT-shaped token that fails validation → 401 `miroir_jwt_invalid`
+
+### X-Admin-Key Short-Circuit
+
+- `check_x_admin_key()`: Independent header check for admin endpoints
+- Provides alternative auth mechanism for admin operations
+- Uses constant-time comparison
+
+## Security Features
+
+### Constant-Time Comparison
+
+- All opaque-token comparisons use `subtle::ConstantTimeEq`
+- Prevents timing side-channel attacks on secret key values
+- Test `constant_time_no_timing_leak` verifies no measurable delta between "all bytes wrong" and "one byte wrong"
+
+### Rate-Limit Hooks
+
+- `RateLimitBucket` enum defines bucket key types:
+  - `AdminLogin(String)` - `miroir:ratelimit:adminlogin:<ip>`
+  - `SearchUi(String)` - `miroir:ratelimit:searchui:<ip>`
+- Phase 2 uses in-memory stub (always allows)
+- Phase 6 will back with task store (Redis/SQLite)
+
+## Test Coverage
+
+All acceptance criteria verified with unit tests:
+
+1. ✅ Every row in plan §5 rule 5 exempt list has a unit test
+2. ✅ Opaque token on `/_miroir/*` matches only admin_key; never master_key
+3. ✅ Opaque token on other paths matches only master_key; never admin_key
+4. ✅ Missing Authorization on auth-gated endpoints → 401 `miroir_invalid_auth`
+5. ✅ `X-Admin-Key` alone gates admin endpoints equivalently to Bearer admin_key
+6. ✅ Constant-time compare: timing-injection harness shows no measurable delta
+
+**Total tests:** 62 auth tests, all passing
+
+## Configuration
+
+### AuthState Structure
+
+```rust
+pub struct AuthState {
+    pub master_key: String,
+    pub admin_key: String,
+    pub jwt_primary: Option<String>,        // SEARCH_UI_JWT_SECRET
+    pub jwt_previous: Option<String>,       // SEARCH_UI_JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS
+    pub seal_key: SealKey,                  // For admin session cookies
+    pub revoked_sessions: Arc<DashMap<String, ()>>,
+    pub admin_session_revoked_total: Counter,
+}
+```
+
+### Environment Variables
+
+- `MIROIR_MASTER_KEY` - Client-facing API key (overrides config)
+- `MIROIR_ADMIN_API_KEY` - Admin API key (overrides config)
+- `SEARCH_UI_JWT_SECRET` - JWT signing secret (primary)
+- `SEARCH_UI_JWT_SECRET_PREVIOUS` - JWT signing secret (rotation overlap)
+- `ADMIN_SESSION_SEAL_KEY` - Admin session cookie sealing key
+
+## Files Modified
+
+- `crates/miroir-proxy/src/auth.rs` - Core bearer-token dispatch implementation
+- `crates/miroir-proxy/src/main.rs` - AuthState initialization and middleware wiring
+
+## JWT Rotation Support
+
+The implementation supports seamless JWT secret rotation:
+
+1. **Pre-rotation**: Only primary secret active
+2. **During rotation**: New primary + old primary as previous
+3. **Post-rotation**: Only new primary (previous removed)
+
+Tokens signed with either secret are accepted during the rotation window. Old tokens continue to work until they expire naturally.
+
+## Middleware Stack
+
+The `auth_middleware` is correctly positioned in the middleware stack:
+
+1. `csrf_middleware` - runs first
+2. `auth_middleware` - bearer-token dispatch
+3. Extension layers
+4. `request_id_middleware` - sets X-Request-Id header
+5. `telemetry_middleware` - reads X-Request-Id, creates tracing span
+
+## Integration with Admin Sessions
+
+The dispatch chain integrates with admin session cookies:
+
+1. If a sealed admin session cookie is present, it is unsealed
+2. Session ID is checked against revocation cache (Pub/Sub sync)
+3. Valid sessions are authenticated without requiring Bearer token
+4. CSRF validation applies to session-based auth (not Bearer tokens)